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Carlisle Ford Runge*

Risk Assessment and
Environmental Benefits Analysist
ABSTRACT
Benefits analysis applied to regulations involving health risks, such as
primary air quality standards, faces two types of uncertainty. One is
regulatory uncertainty: absence of information concerning the supply of
and demand for regulated air quality. The second is scientific uncertainty:
lack of information on thresholds defining air quality health standards.
When these uncertainties interact, they define "net social risk," modeled
as a social welfare constraint on maximization of regulatory benefits. This
risk can be lowered by raising standards or by reducing regulatory and
scientific uncertainty. Current policy does neither, limiting options for
regulatory efficiency and raising net social risks.
INTRODUCTION
Benefits analysis is increasingly used to weigh environmental policy
alternatives and gain control over the regulatory process.' An important
aspect of this process is improvement of public safety including reductions
in health risks. One recent instance is President Reagan's Executive Order
calling for "regulatory impact analysis," using "net social benefits" as
a major criterion. 2 Like other recent administrative actions, the order calls
on policy makers to analyze not only costs and benefits, but also the
riskiness of regulatory alternatives. 3 Here and elsewhere in the law, the
relationship betwen benefits analysis and risk assessment is ambiguous.
In some cases, risks are treated as separate from net benefits. For
example, the Clean Air Act as amended in 1977 precludes benefits analysis
'My thanks to Don Waldman, V. Kerry Smith, and Tom Feagans for suggestions and comments.
An earlier version was presented at the Conference on the Implications of Executive Order 12,291
for Environmental Policy, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, October 11-12, 1982. The article was
completed during a Visiting Fellowship in the Food and Agricultural Policy Program of Resources
for the Future.
*Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota.
1. Baram, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety and Environmental
Regulatory Decisionmaking, 8 ECOLOGY L. Q. 473 (1980); Field, Patternsin the Laws on Health
Risks, 1 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 257 (1982).
2. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
3. EPA, Draft of Guidelines for Performing Regulatory Impact Analysis, App. A: Regulating
Impact Analysis Guidance for Benefits (April 5, 1982).
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for the purpose of setting primary standards for criteria pollutants. 4 Instead, these standards must be set to avoid risks to human health.' In
other cases risks and benefits are treated as comparable. More than 10
federal statutes require or propose the use of "risk-benefit analysis" as
if an accepted basis for analysis existed. Unfortunately, it does not.6
This article analyzes the relationship between benefits analysis and
environmental risk assessment, focusing on problems of primary standards for air quality. It first compares uncertainty in regulatory benefits
analysis with uncertainty in assessing health risks. It then argues that
setting air quality standards involves both types of uncertainty. Their
interaction leads to the development of a combined measure: "net social
risk." Net social risk is then modeled as a constraint on net social benefits
of regulation. Whether it is a binding constraint reflects ethical judgments
about social welfare involving trade-offs between benefits and risk. The
article concludes with some implications of these trade-offs for environmental policy.
REGULATORY AND SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY
Regulatory Uncertainty
Benefits analysis for a good such as air quality involves estimation of
willingness to pay in terms of the area under a demand curve derived
from direct or indirect expressions of individual preferences. Assuming
such a demand curve can be estimated, alternative supply levels of clean
air can then be described as a function of different regulatory states-ofthe world. An increase in the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
primary S02 standard, for example, can be expected to lead to a shift in
the supply of air quality measured for this criteria pollutant. In principle,
estimates of increases in consumer surplus are then calculable. 7
At least two types of uncertainty arise in this calculation. First, on the
demand side, exact estimates of willingness to pay are difficult. Demand
4. Clean Air Act § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (Supp. 1 1977).
5. Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (Supp. 1 1977). In 1979, EPA, commenting on the
revised standard for ozone, stated that the primary standard should be set "to protect public health
adequately. Considerations of cost of achieving these standards or of the existence of technology to
bring about needed reductions of emissions are not germane to such a determination .
44 Fed.
Reg. 8,211 (1979).
6. Moreau, Quantitative Assessments of Health Risks by Selected Federal Agencies: A Review of
PresentPractices with SpecialAttention to Non-CarcinogenicSubstances 3-9 (1980) (Environmental
Protection Agency Report); Moreau, Hyman, Stiftel & Nichols, Elicitation of Environmental Values
in Multiple Objective Water Resource Decision Making 37 (1980) (Dept. of City & Regional
Planning, U.N.C.); Ricci & Molton, Risks and Benefits in Environmental Law, 214 SCI. 1096
(1981).
7. See R. JUST, D. L. HUETH & A. SCHMITZ, APPLIED WELFARE ECONOMICS AND
PUBLIC POLICY 69-83; see alsoA. M. FREEMAN, III, THE BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPROVEMENT 1-59 (1979).
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estimates are subject to bias especially in cases of public goods such as
air quality, although recent research suggests the degree of bias is sensitive
to the estimation method.8 These errors can in principle be overcome
with increasingly sophisticated methods. 9 A second source of uncertainty
is on the supply side. Increases in the supply of clean air are inherently
difficult to measure. The ability of federal regulation to achieve targeted
state and regional air quality levels is also uncertain. This is due to lack
of knowledge concerning the way a change in standards affects the complicated transmission mechanism linking emissions from point sources to
air quality. Furthermore, simply choosing a particular primary air quality
standard does not mean that the standard will be implemented and enforced through state implementation programs (SIP's) and secondary standards..'"
Together, these problems can be described as regulatory uncertainty,
reflecting the difficulty of estimating benefits resulting from air quality
standards when regulated levels are not achieved with certainty. Even
where they are, preferences for the result may be inaccurately represented
by estimates of demand. Regulatory uncertainty is related to health risk,
but is distinct from the type of uncertainty most important in current risk
assessment studies.
Scientific Uncertainty
Under the Clean Air Act as amended in 1977, the Federal Government
is responsible for primary air quality standards stringent enough to protect
the public health with an "adequate margin of safety."" Assessment of
environmental risk inside the EPA has focused on the health effects of
Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standards (PNAAQS). When a
particular pollutant "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the public
health or welfare," the EPA Administrator must publish an air quality
criteria document which forms the scientific basis for the standard. 12
PNAAQS defines the degree of protection from adverse health effects
to be achieved, stated in, terms of time-averaged pollutant concentrations
and the expected number of cases in which these concentrations will be
8. Bishop & Heberlein, Measuring Values ofExtramarket Goods:Are Indirect Measures Biased?,
61 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 926 (1979); Brookshire, Thayer, Schulze & d'Arge, Valuing Public
Goods: A Comparison of Survey and Hedonic Approaches, 72 AM. ECON. REV. No. I at 165
(1982); Desvousges, Smith & Fisher, Direct and Indirect Methods of Valuing Public Goods: Further
Evidence (1982) (Dept. of Econ., U.N.C.).
9. Fisher & Smith, Economic Evaluation of Energy's Environmental Costs with Special Reference
to Air Polluttion, 7 ANN. REV. ENERGY 1 (1982).
10. McKean, Enforcement Costs in Environmental and Safety Regulation, 6 POL'Y ANALYSIS
269 (1980).
I1.Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (Supp. 1 1977).
12. Clean Air Act § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1 1977).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

exceeded per unit of time. Health risks associated with a standard are
risks of adverse health effects for a given population in a given time
period when the standard is being met. These risk assessments are essentially estimates grounded in scientific data. The uncertainty associated
with these estimates is meant to be distinct from the regulatory uncertainty
raised by the possibility of non-compliance or non-enforcement.1 3
Primary standards accompanying the criteria document also are theoretically distinct from attainment costs. Neither cost estimates nor the
uncertainty surrounding them are a germane consideration, entering only
at the level of state implementation and the development of secondary
standards to protect the public welfare. 4 This separation of costs from
health risks has motivated a careful inquiry into the definition of such
risks, but has heightened the sense that some basis for comparing net
benefits with health risks must be found, especially in a practical regulatory environment in which primary standards must be defended in terms
of their secondary effects on the population at risk.
Scientific analysis of health risks associated with PNAAQS is based
on two presumptions. The first is that it is possible to identify some level
of air quality which functions as a type of scientific threshold so that a
"margin of safety" can be determined. Below this threshold there are
unacceptable risks of health impairment to the population. Second, it is
presumed possible to model the relationship between human health and
air quality, so that this scientific threshold can be determined and primary
standards set to avoid it. Both presumptions are questionable given existing knowledge. The level of air quality identified as a threshold is
uncertain because of an absence of complete information concerning
pollutants and their health effects. Even where scientific information on
health effects exists, it is subject to false associations between pollutants
and morbidity and mortality. I5
This scientific uncertainty is the main focus of environmental risk
assessment. Where hard scientific information cannot be found, recent
EPA research has extended its efforts to reduce risk by encoding more
subjective, "transcientific" judgments to estimate the probability of air
quality impacts on human health. These estimates are nonetheless a result
of scientific judgments by experts on chemical and biological processes. 16
13. Feagans & Biller, Assessing the Health Risks Associated with Air Quality Standards, 3
ENVTL. PROF. 235 (1981).
14. O'Connor, Overview of the Criteria Review and Standard Setting Process, EPA OFFICE OF
AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS REP. (1981).
15. See R. CRANDALL & L. LAVE, THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY
REGULATION (1981).
16. Feagans & Biller, supra note 13; Feagans & Biller, A General Method for Assessing Health
Risks Associated with Primary National Quality Standards (1981) (Environmental Protection Agency
Report; Bazelon, Risk and Responsibility, 65 A.B.A. J. 1068 (1979); Richmond, A Framework for
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In summary, regulatory uncertainty involves absence of information
concerning the supply of and demand for regulated air quality. This is
due to ignorance about the transmission mechanism from point source
abatement to air quality, errors in implementing and enforcing primary
standards, and errors in estimating consumer preferences. Reducing this
uncertainty would improve policy makers' ability to estimate the impacts
and thus the net benefits of regulation. Scientific uncertainty results both
from a lack of information on the relationship between human health and
air quality, and from resulting errors in determining threshold levels where
unacceptable risks are posed to certain populations, Reducing scientific
uncertainty would improve policy makers' ability to set primary standards
in such a way that health thresholds for these groups are not crossed.
NET SOCIAL RISK

In the formulation of environmental policy, regulatory uncertainty and
scientific uncertainty are not separable. Their interaction is one cause of
current regulatory dilemmas. Regulatory uncertainty may be defined with
respect to the choice of a primary standard and an accompanying set of
secondary standards and state implementation plans. Restricting attention
to a single criteria pollutant such as SO 2, the standard in period i is simply
Ai. In these terms, the regulatory dilemma is as follows. If the impact
measured for SO2 resulting from PNAAQS on sulfur oxides is uncertain,
there is some probability that realized air quality after implementation
and enforcement will fall below the threshold level deemed an unacceptable risk to human health. However, since this threshold is itself
uncertain, even a PNAAQS with known impacts on air quality may have
uncertain effects on health risks to well-defined populations. Therefore,
the interaction of the two types of uncertainty becomes the relevant concern.

The interaction of regulatory and scientific uncertainty produces a composite measure of the impact of a particular standard on human health,
which may be defined as net social risk. To see this more clearly, let
Q(Ai) = a random variable defining the level of air quality associated with a particular standard, in this case for SO2 .
= a random variable defining the threshold level of air
Ti
quality deemed an unacceptable risk to the health of a
well-defined population.
Assessing Health Risks Associated with NationalAmbient Air Quality Standards, 3 ENVTL. PROF.
224, 229 (1981); Richmond, McCurdy & Jordan, Risk Analysis in the Context of National Ambient
Air Quality Standards (1982) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Air Pollution Control
Association, New Orleans).
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These variables are assumed to be continuously distributed with non-zero
mean and variance.
E(Q) = IFQ; V(Q) = cQ2
E(T) = I T; V(T) = T2

Note that crQ2 and

CrT 2

represent regulatory and scientific uncertainty re-

spectively.
In more formal terms, the regulatory dilemma described above is that
for any well-defined group, the level of air quality Q associated with a
standard Ai may be less than the threshold level deemed an unacceptable
health risk Ti. The probability of this event is the net social risk associated
with the standard. Net social risk R exists where there is some positive
probability that the level of air quality associated with the implementation
and enforcement of the PNAAQS is less than that prescribed by the
threshold. 17 The positive probability of this event is given as
R = Pr (Q <T) > 0
= Pr[(Q - T) <0] > 0.
The difference (Q - T) defines a third random variable A(Ai), the convolution of Q and (-T), distributed with its own mean and variance.
This variable captures the difference between the air quality achieved
under the standard and the scientific threshold of acceptable risk. Specifically, it is the case that

E(A)
V(A)

= I"a
=

cA

=
2

=

QOQ

2

R,
+

OrT2

-

2c"QT.

The expectation pL
A is, therefore, a function of the expected impact of
the standard on air quality (PLQ) as well as the expected threshold of health
risk (P1T). Since uncertainty surrounds both of these air quality levels,
the variance of A is a measure of uncertainty from both regulatory and
2
scientific sources, since CrUA
is an additive function of arQ' , (TT 2 , and crQT.

Because regulatory standards must be set once a threshold is determined,
lags associated with this process imply that the contemporaneous corre8
lation between Q and T, CrQT, is zero.'
This formulation allows a more precise description of the interaction
of regulatory and scientific uncertainty resulting in net social risk. If R
is judged to be unacceptably high, there are two major ways to reduce
17. This requires that the densities for Q and T overlap for some interval, which seems plausible
if standards are set so as to just meet the threshold level of health risk, as currently mandated.
18. If standards were set without a lag, then arr could arguably be large and positive. This would
offset (r 2 and crr2 in the expression for a2 to a degree determined by the relative magnitude of these
terms. A plausible interpretation is that if regulations could respond contemporaneously to health
risks, such quick responses could mitigate scientific and regulatory uncertainty.
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it. First, policy makers can attempt to raise the expected effect of the
standard on air quality. Given a fixed level of uncertainty around RQ due
to problems of translating the standard into actual air quality, one obvious
way to raise .Q is by raising the primary standard. This assumes that the
expected threshold defining an acceptable health hazard to the population
(IXT) is fixed on the basis of scientific data. If this threshold is considered
more subjectively, different interpretations may lead to different thresholds. If we assume that PT is fixed, however, then setting pLQ low raises
the net social risk that a threshold of unacceptable health risk will be
crossed. Setting it higher lowers net social risk, but is likely to involve
greater regulatory costs. This trade-off will become more explicit in a
constrained-maximization framework below.
the2
Turning to the variance term %TA2,it is clearly possible to reduce
2
uncertainty that the standard is too low by reductions in either crQ or o-T
or both. Regulatory uncertainty can presumably be reduced by increased
information on the linkages between primary standards and air quality.
In addition to better measurement, information on the transmissions of
SO2 from point sources to general air quality will reduce crQ 2, together
with assurance that the standard will be implemented and enforced. Scientific uncertainty, the focus of EPA's risk assessment efforts, can be
reduced by better information on links from SO 2 to morbidity and mortality. This will allow more well-defined thresholds for particular criteria
pollutants. 19
In summary, net social risk may be considered the probability that
standards are too low to avoid a threshold of hazard. The fewer cases
are accepted of adverse health affects per unit of time and the lower
primary standards are set in relation to this threshold, the greater this
probability will be. The more uncertainty which surrounds both standard
and threshold, the more uncertainty exists over whether the standard is
sufficient to avoid such hazards.
NET SOCIAL RISK AS A CONSTRAINT
ON REGULATORY BENEFITS
Ooosing an acceptable level of net social risk is fundamentally an
ethical question, because standards and thresholds involve normative
judgments. "Acceptable" health hazards defining a threshold may result
in damage or even death if the standard chosen is low. Willingness to
accept these hazards must result from an explicit or implicit trade-off
between net social benefits and human life and health. The assessment
19. Feagans & Biller, supra note 13.
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of risk is thus linked to the value attached to morbidity and mortality.20
If net benefits are measured as efficiency gains, the normative character
of net social risk suggests that this risk is part of a social welfare function
constraining efficient economic choices.
Treating net social risk in this way acknowledges its relationship to
other issues of social welfare including equity. Indeed, the distinction
between equity and acceptable net social risk is blurred. To decide how
high the probability should be that a standard is within range of an
unacceptable threshold is to put a value on adverse effects to some individuals. A decision to accept high rather than low net social risks is
therefore a decision to treat different persons differently. Such distinctions
are at the heart of equity judgments, making them a question of social
welfare.21
One response minimizing the importance of such questions is that if
net social risks are borne collectively, they impose comparatively little
private burden as the numbers in the population at risk increase.22 But as
Anthony Fisher noted, the nonexcludable public good characteristics of
risk regulations may lead to the opposite conclusion: risks may rise with
increasing numbers if each person bears the same amount .23Furthermore,
if the population at risk varies over time, the assumption of collective
risk-bearing does not hold either. For a variety of reasons, individuals
will not be identically susceptible to health effects from air pollution or
other sources over time, making collective risk-bearing implausible.
In addition to equity, net social risk is conceptually linked to what
' ' 24 Most
Talbot Page terms the fallacy of regulatory "false negatives.
risks subject to government regulation proceed on the assumption that
pollutants must be proven hazardous to be considered risky. If evidence
of hazard is scanty, regulatory decisions setting high standards are viewed
as costly and wasteful. Such overregulation is considered analogous to a
"false positive" or Type I statistical error, in which the null hypothesis
of no effect is true and is erroneously rejected by overzealous regulation.
This view is advanced in a variety of recent EPA documents and policy
pronouncements.25
In contrast, "false negatives" occur when failure to find evidence of
adverse health effects leads to the fallacious conclusion that no such effects
20. Richmond, McCurdy & Jordan, supra note 16; Rowe, Government Regulation of Societal
Risks, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 944, 967 (1977).
21. See D. MACRAE, JR., THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1976).
22. Arrow & Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions, 60 AMER.
ECON. REV. 364 (1970).
23. Fisher, Environmental Externalities and the Arrow-Lind Public Investment Theorem, 63 AMER.
ECON. REV. 722 (1973).
24. Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207 (1978).
25. EPA, supra note 3, at 7; EPA's High Risk Carcinogen Policy, 218 SCI. 975 (1982).
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can occur. Acceptance of the null hypothesis of no effect may prove false
when more is known about the structure of the problem. In the case of
air quality, minimizing the probability of false negatives requires reduced
uncertainty regarding both regulatory impacts and scientific links from
pollution to human health. As Page notes, "The less uncertain the structure (i.e., the more information available), the more likely it is that a
negative finding will lead to a valid conclusion." 2 6 Reducing both regulatory and scientific uncertainty, and therefore net social risk, makes
this structure more clear.27
Modeled as a social welfare constraint on economically efficient outcomes, net social risk can be related directly to benefits analysis. Let an
objective function for net social benefits of regulation be defined in terms
of expected air quality levels associated with a particular set of national
ambient standards. An objective function (G) expresses the expected sum
of measurable economic costs C(Ai) and benefits B(Ai) from air quality
regulation over a time horizon of n periods. These are maximized when
the expected sum of net benefits associated with standards (AO,A1, ...
A...An)
in periods 0 to n is greatest. Benefits are thus expressed as a function of
air quality standards in each period.
Air quality standards are the choice variable leading to expected levels
of air quality. When net social benefits are discounted at some rate riin
each period, the expression for the expected sum of net benefits from
regulation is as follows:
26. Page, supra note 24, at 232.
27. Let the null hypothesis be such that the air quality associated with a PNAAQS is sufficiently
high that the threshold of hazard is not crossed and no adverse health effects result so that A = (Q
- T)->O. The alternative hypothesis is that it is crossed, leading to unacceptable hazards, so that
A = (Q - T)<O. Hence:
Ho : (Q - T)_-0
TH,:(Q - T)<O
The relationship between acceptance, rejection and the truth value of these hypotheses is shown in
the table following, together with designation of false positive (Type I) and false negative (Type II)
error.
Decision
State of
the World

Accept I.

Reject H.

H. true:
(Q - T)->O

correct decision

incorrect decision
(false
positive-Type I error)

H, true:
(Q - T)<O

incorrect decision
(false
negative-Type II error)

correct decision

Since net social risk is given as R = Pr[(Q - T)<O]>O, a positive value of R can only result if
there is some probability that the alternative hypothesis H.: (Q - T)<O is true. A false negative
finding is possible only if H. is possible, in which case R>O.
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C(Ai)1

iTr(l + ri)

These net benefits are subject to regulatory uncertainty associated with
the impact of the standards as described above.
Now let a social welfare function denote an acceptable level of net
social risk R* in each period, such that the actual level R(Ai) is less
than or equal to R*. The social welfare function implies the constraint
R(Ai)-<R* on the maximization of net benefits. The problem is to maximize the expected level of discounted net benefits subject to the constraint
posed by acceptable net social risk.

n

1]

0 B(Ai) - C(Ai) |

Max E[G(Ai)] = E

i=0
S.

R* -R(Ai)> 0

Ai_>0
The Lagrangean expression follows, where X is the shadow value or
Lagrangean multiplier associated with the constraint.

=E[L

B(Ai) -

C(Ai)

+

ir(1 + ri)

X [R* - R(Ai)]

Ii

Kuhn-Tucker Conditions for a maximum are
(1)

ai

<

(2)

a

> 0

0

Ai

aL

i = 0

XaL

ax -0

Ai_-0 X-O
These conditions can be useful in measuring the trade-offs between net
economic efficiency benefits and net social risks. The first pair are con-
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ditions for a maximum level of net benefits from regulated air quality.
Where aL = 0, if it is the case that Ai>O, an interior maximum is achieved
aAi
by setting expected discounted marginal benefits of regulation (MB) equal
to expected discounted marginal costs (MC). However, if the shadow
value of net social risk is positive (the risk constraint is binding), first
order conditions for a maximum require that
aL =
MB - MC
aAi

-

X8R
aAi

-

MC.

=

0

so that
MB -

aAi

In other words, optimality requires that expected discounted marginal
benefits of regulation, minus X times the marginal value of risk, be set
equal to marginal costs. A "risk factor" equal to XaR has entered the
aAi
efficiency conditions for a maximum. However, if X= 0 the risk constraint
is not binding, so first order conditons for a maximum are
aL
aAi

-

MB - MC = 0

so that
MB = MC.

Here the risk factor does not affect the marginal efficiency conditions.
Hence, whether economic efficiency is constrained by a risk factor depends entirely on whether R* is set so that the risk constraint is binding.
A similar story may be told if Ai = 0 and a corner solution represents a
maximum.
The second set of conditions concerns the risk constraint itself. If the
risk constraint is binding and the shadow value is positive, then R* = R(Ai).
As the shadow
As value rises, so does the expression
exressin XaRi,
~,so that the risk
factor in the marginal conditions increases in magnitude. The value of X
is tantamount to the social value of acceptable risk. If the constraint is
binding, estimating this value is a necessary condition for the formulation
of policy.
Note, however, that given R* (a social welfare judgment) and a particular value of X associated with a binding risk constraint R* =R(Ai),
it is possible to make the constraint non-binding by reducing R(Ai) below
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R*. As discussed above, this can result either from raising the expected
impact of the standard on air quality (raising fLQ) or from reduction in
regulatory and scientific uncertainty (lowering crQ2 or UT 2 ). Increases in
the expected impact of the standard will be likely to raise the costs of
regulation so that risks are traded off directly for regulatory costs. Reductions in both regulatory and scientific uncertainty, however, may involve a more favorable trade-off. Since knowledge of the structure of
regulation and health hazards has general social utility, it may cost less
to trade risk for information than for regulation. Increasing regulatory
and scientific certainty, in short, can loosen the risk constraint at the same
time that it improves the general store of knowledge, allowing unconstrained pursuit of net social benefits.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
To summarize, the above analysis is predicated on a distinction between
regulatory and scientific uncertainty. Regulatory uncertainty confronts the
ability of benefits analysis to estimate demand for regulations affecting
air quality and the impact of these regulations on the quantity of clean
air supplied. Health risks, in contrast, are subject to scientific uncertainty
about the relationship between pollutants and acceptable thresholds of
human morbidity and mortality. Regulatory decisions respecting national
ambient air quality standards involve both types of uncertainty. Taken
together, these uncertainties define the net social risk that standards may
be too low to maintain the thresholds called for under law. Once social
welfare judgments establish an acceptable level of net social risk, this
risk can be considered a constraint on the net benefits of regulation, which
can only be loosened by increasingly stringent standards or reductions in
regulatory or scientific uncertainty.
These results have a number of implications for environmental policy.
First, they suggest the inescapable interplay between regulation and human health associated with environmental hazards. Because this interplay
has social welfare implications, such regulations can never be reduced
to pure questions of economic efficiency as long as the constraint of net
social risk is binding. Hence, there is a need to identify and estimate
explicitly the shadow value of acceptable net social risk. Policy makers
can then make social welfare judgments which, while still normative, are
at least non-arbitrary. Estimating the shadow value of net social risk is
therefore an important task of policy research.2 8
28. Gallaher & Smith, Measuring Values for Environmental Resources Under Uncertainty (1982)

(Dept. of Econ., U.N.C.).
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A second implication is the attractiveness of policies which promote
greater regulatory and scientific certainty. Regulatory certainty can be
increased through research in the entire range of questions linking benefits
to the supply of and demand for environmental regulation.29 Scientific
certainty can be increased through efforts inside EPA and elsewhere to
monitor and estimate the hazards posed by environmental pollution .30
These increases in information can make the net social risk constraint
non-binding, freeing regulators to pursue efficiency goals. If such information is useful in other contexts, its acquisition is likely to be less costly
than increasingly stringent standards. Where information is simply unavailable, especially in the short run, increasing standards may be a
second-best response to unacceptable risk. But a first-best response, especially in the long run, may be increased certainty resulting from expanded research programs in policy and environmental science. Because
the two types of uncertainty may be interrelated, research on regulation
and scientific hazards must be closely tied in conduct and performance.
As Crandall and Lave demonstrate, the scientific basis of 31regulation is
an increasingly important field of interdisciplinary inquiry.
A final set of points questions the wisdom of current policy. It is ironic
that Administration advocates of regulatory efficiency, who champion the
estimation of net regulatory benefits under Executive Order 12,291, have
reduced support for research activities which might provide insight into
the structure of regulation and its impact on health. Reductions in enforcement of environmental standards as well as declining numbers of
scientific staff at EPA and elsewhere will be likely to increase both regulatory and scientific uncertainty in the future. If the foregoing analysis
is correct, these increases will reduce the flexibility of policy makers to
substitute information for regulation. This leaves a more difficult policy
choice between costly increases in environmental standards-or admitted
increases in net social risk-as both regulatory impacts and health effects
become more uncertain. Current policy, opposed to increased stringency
of standards, appears to tolerate increased risks and even to loosen the
definition of acceptable health hazard thresholds. 32 A far more attractive
29. E.g., Bailey, Risks, Costs, and Benefits of Fluorocarbon Regulation, 72 AMER. ECON.
REV. No. 2 at 247 (1982); Jordan, Richmond & McCurdy, Regulatory Perspectives on the Use of
Scientific Information in Air Quality Standard Setting (1981) (paper presented at the annual meeting
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science); L. LAVE, STRATEGY OF SOCIAL
REGULATION: DECISION FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY (1981); Regans, Dietz & Rycroft, Risk
Assessment in the Policy-Making Process: Environmental Health and Safety Protection (1982) (paper
presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association).
30. See Feagans & Biller, supra note 16.
31. CRANDALL & LAVE, supra note 15.
32. EPA's High Risk Carcinogen Policy, supra note 25.
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option would be to reduce both regulatory and scientific uncertainty,
freeing government to pursue efficiency in regulation without increasing
either standards or levels of net social risk. Increasing alarm over environmental health hazards resulting from failure to achieve regulatory
standards suggests that current policies may not reflect the shadow value
of net social risk held by society as a whole. Estimates of this value will
require further investigation.

